The concept of first-order stochastic dominance defined on distributions is inadequate in models with learning. We extend this concept to the space of distributions on distributions. We discuss conditions under which for all common observations one person's beliefs (over a set of probability distributions) dominate another person's beliefs by first-order stochastic dominance. We obtain sufficient conditions for this partial order and show that the sufticient conditions are necessary, provided that the underlying distributions satisfy an additional assumption. These conditions can be verified without taking any observations. Applications are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: Cll, DSO, D81, D83. 0 1992
INTRODUCTION
The concept of first-order stochastic dominance is usually defined on probability distributions over final outcomes (simple lotteries). Although this definition has been widely applied in economics, there are situations where it is inadequate. In this paper we analyze the concept of first-order stochastic dominance for probability distributions over probability distributions (compound lotteries) under Bayesian learning. e discuss conditions under which one person's beliefs dominate another person's beliefs by first-order stochastic dominance regardless of what they observe in common. We provide sufficient conditions on prior beliefs under whit this is true. These conditions can be easily verified without taking any observations.
One may claim that it is unnecessary to define stochastic dominance relationships between updated beliefs. For instance, one may multipfy probabilities in the compound lotteries and apply the usual definition of stochastic dominance to the resulting actuarially equivalent simple lotteries. However, the partial order on compound lotteries obtained by ~ornpar~n~ actuarially equivalent simple lotteries may not be very useful from a normative standpoint. When a decision-maker faces a series of decisions, with some resolution of uncertainty between decisi valuable information may be lost by multiplying probabilities in a di ution on distributions. In any setting where there is learning, the usual concept of first-order stochastic dominance for distributions may be inadequate. This is illustrated by the following example, adapted from ~ikhchanda~i and Sharma [2] .
Consider a risk-neutral decision-maker searching uentially (with or without recall) for the lowest price. Let F, be a un m distribution on CO, I] and let G, , G, be uniform distributions on CO, i) and [i, I], respectively. F is the compound lottery which is degenerate at F, and G is the compound lottery which yields the simple lottery Gi with probability 1, i = 1,2. The decision-maker may either take price samples from F only, or from G only. The cost of each sample is i. It is well kn searching from a known distribution (i.e., a simple lottery) to stop as soon as one observes a price less than some reservation price (see, where c is the cost of each sample. Moreover, the minimum expected cost is equal to r. (The cost includes the price paid for the good as well as the sampling cost.) Thus, when searching from F, the minimum expected cost and the reservation price are both equal to l/d. On the other hand, when searching from G, the decision-maker knows after exactly one observation whether he is searching from G, or G,. Using (1.1) it is easy to check that it is optimal to stop after the first observation from 6, and the minimum expected cost is 0.75. Clearly, both F and G have the same actuarially equivalent simple lottery, and yet the expected cost is lower under F. The usual definition of first-order stochastic dominance, when applied to actuarially equivalent simple lotteries, is inadequate. ' Our concept of stochastic dominance under Bayesian learning, what we call Bayes'first-order stochastic dominance, states that a compound lottery P dominates another compound lottery G if after any sequence of (common) observations, the actuarially equivalent simple lottery of the posterior distribution of p dominates the actuarially equivalent simple lottery of the posterior distribution of G, by ordinary first-order stochastic dominance. In the search example above, after one observation the posterior distribution of F remains unchanged whereas the posterior distribution of G is either degenerate at G, or degenerate at G,. Thus F and G cannot be compared by Bayes' first-order stochastic dominance. It can be shown that if a compound lottery $ dominates another compound lottery 6 by Bayes' first-order stochastic dominance, then the expected total cost (price of good plus sampling cost) is lower under G.
Bayes' first-order stochastic dominance is not a new concept. This and other related concepts have been used in the literature. For instance, Bayes' first-order stochastic dominance is the same as Berry and Fristedt's [ 1 ] concept of "strongly to the right," which is useful in deriving comparative static results for the bandit problem. For the case when the simple lotteries have two final outcomes, Berry and Fristedt provide an equivalent condition for Bayes' first-order stochastic dominance. However, in order to check this condition all possible sequences of observations have to be considered. The contribution of our paper is that it provides easily verifiable conditions for Bayes' first-order stochastic dominance between compound lotteries with finitely many final outcomes. More importantly, our conditions can be checked without taking any observations.2 A related question has been addressed by Whitt [I93 and aileron [14] . They are interested in conditions under which the posterior distribution of a compound lottery updated after an observation dominates another posterior distribution of the same compound lottery updated after a less favorable observation, by first-order stochastic dominance. We discuss the relationship between this concept and ayes' first-order stochastic dominance in Section 3.
This paper assumes the existence of probabilities of probabilities. Some authors argue against this concept (for a discussion see ~arschak [127, and in particular de Finetti [6]). We presume that they mean that when there is no learning, probabilities of probabilities are equivalent to ies, but when there is learning, the two are different. That, at is Totrep's view in Kreps' [9, p. 150 ] splendid drama concerning Our results are as follows. We show that when each underlying simple lottery is over the same two final outcomes, a compound lottery F dominates another compound lottery G by ayes' first-order stochastic dominance if and only if F is a convex transformation of G (in a sense made precise later), if and only if the expected final outcome from any updated version of F is greater than the expected final outcome from an updated version of G using the same observations. This generalizes to the: case where the underlying simple lotteries yieid a finite number of final outcomes provided that the simple lotteries can be completely ordered by ordinary first-order stochastic dominance and satisfy an a~d~tio~a~ assumption The paper is organized as follows. We give necessary and sufhcient conditions for Bayes' first-order stochastic domina~cc in Section 2. first analyze the case when there are two final outcomes and then the when there are finitely many final outcomes. Ap~~~cat~o~s are discusse Section 3. All proofs are in the Appendix. An observation from a compound lottery F is an outcome, Xi. We will sometimes refer to xi as the final outcome. The simple lottery Xi which gives this final outcome is not observed. Successive observations are independent draws from the same simple lottery Xi. After observing ti realizations of xi, t, realizations of x2, and so on, the decision-maker uses Bayes' rule to obtain a posterior compound lottery in L, which is denoted by F(t,, t,, . . . . tM), or F(T), where T=(tl, t,, . . . . tM), Let a,(T) be the posterior probability given T that Xj is the true simple lottery. By Bayes' rule,
BAYES' FIRST-ORDER
Since we assume that P, > 0 for all i, j, ai( T) is well defined for all i and T.4 Thus F(T)= (q(T), a,(T), .,., a,(T)). However, (2.3) is an impractical condition for applications, since it requires that the posterior distributions F(T) and G(T) be computed for all T. It is our aim here to find easily computable conditions equivalent to P"+ 6. The main result of this section is stated below. The proof is omitted since Theorem 1 is a special case of Theorem 3 below. that the cumulative distribution function of F is a convex transformation of the cumulative distribution function of G. Conditions (iii) and (iv) can be checked easily, since they do not require any observations. Conditions (i) and (ii) cannot be checked in general, since they are conditions on the updated distributions F(T) and G(T) for all T.
Many Final Outcomes
In this section we consider the case when each simple lottery yields finitely many outcomes. We restrict ourselves to the case where X, FOSD .XNmI . . . FOSD X1. We first show that (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6) are sufficient for F+ G. 
G3)
It can be shown that even when X,, X,, . . . . X, are ordered by F (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6) are not necessary for F+ G. However, these condil tions are necessary when X1, X,, . . . . X,,, are of a special type defined below. In the two final outcomes case considered in Section 2.1 any collection of simple lotteries are of types 1, 2, and 3. To see this, label the simple lotteries over two final outcomes X,, X,, . . . . X, so that P,, > Pzl > . . > Clearly X,, X,, . . . . X, satisfy (2.8), (2.9), and (2.10). For the case of final outcomes, types 1, 2, and 3 are illustrated in Figs. 1, 2, and 3, re tively. These triangle diagrams show simple lotteries in the P, -P, s Choose any Xi and plot it on a triangle diagram as shown in A similar argument establishes that if Xi, X,, . . . . 1, are of type 2 and Xi is as shown in Fig. 2 , then Xi+ i must lie in the region AFCD, and X,-i must lie in HCE. Also, if Xi, X,, . . . . X,,, are of type 3 and Xi is as in Fig. 3 , then Xj+l is in FCD and Xiel is in HCEB. These figures also show that the three types are not identical.
In each of Figs. 1, 2, and 3, all simple lotteries that dominate Xi (by FOSD) are northwest of Xi, and Xi dominates all simple lotteries to its southeast. Thus, at least for three outcomes, if X,, X,, . . . . X, are of As is evident from Figs. 1, 2, and 3, the converse of Lemma 1 is not true. Also, there exist Xi, X,, . . . . X, which are of types 1, 2, and 3. For example, we can choose X,, X,, . . . . X, which satisfy (2.8) with P,= Pi+l.i, 9=2,3 , . . ..M-1.
i=l,2 ,..., N-1. In the case of three outcomes, if Xi, X2, . ..) X, lie on the line DH in Fig. 2 
then they are of ty
If the underlying simple lotteries are of type I, 2, or 3, then for any i such ahat ai, Mi+ 1, Bi7 Pi+ 1 ) 0, it is possible to find a sequence of observations T such that (i) F(T) and G(T) assign most of their mass to Xj and Xi+ i, and (ii) the relative mass assigned to Xi and Xi+ 1 by F(T) and G( 7-g can be made arbitrarily close to the relative mass assigned to them by F and 6, respectively. Therefore,
E[F((T)] FOSD E[G(T)] only if ai(T)/aj+ ,(T) d P,(WB,+,(T)
only if c+~+ 1 6 Pi/Pi+ 1. Thus (2.6) is necessary for F>i 6. The main result of this section generalizes Theorem 1. So far we have assumed that the supports of the simple lotteries and the compound lotteries are finite sets. The sufficient conditions in Theorem 2 can be generalized to the case where the support of the compound lotteries is an infinite set (and the support of the simple lotteries is a finite set). That is, if 9 is an infinite set of simple lotteries ordered by FOSD, and F and G are compound lotteries with support 9, then if F is a convex transformation of G then F& G (see Bikhchandani, Segal, and Sharma [3] ).
Although we do not have any results for the case where the supports of the simple lotteries and the compound lotteries are infinite sets, we close this section with an example in this setting. Let E; be normally distributed with unknown mean M, and precision 1, and G be normally distributed with unknown mean Mg and precision 1. first-order stochastic dominance. The second question we address is which compound lottery would a decision-maker choose today knowing that he will behave optimally in the future? This comes up in the other examples in this section. We first discuss the relationship between Bayes' first-order stochastic dominance and the papers of Whitt [19] and Milgrom [14] . Let F be a distribution on distributions (i.e., a compound lottery) and let F(yr, yZr . . . . y,) be the posterior distribution (updated by Bayes' rule), after final outcomes yl, y2, . . . . y, are observed. To be consistent with our earlier notation, each yj~ (x1, x2, . . . . x~M). The foclilowing ass~rn~t~~~ is often made in economic models. Let F be a compound lottery which yields simple !otteries X, , X,, . . . . X,.,. Milgrom [ 141 has shown that if X,, X2, ..~, X, have the monotone likelihood ratio property"' (which, as proved in Lemma A.2, is equivalent to assuming that the simple lotteries are of type I), then P is i~cr~as~~~ (see also Whitt [19] ). This can also be proved from Theorem 3 (see ikhchandani, Segal, and Sharma [3]).
Comparative risk aversion and Bayes'first-order stochastic dominance. say that one decision-maker is less risk averse than another if he is w~~~i~g to pay more than the other one for every lottery. Let two expected utility maximizers 4 and II have the same utility function U. Let both face the random variable (x, S; y, 1 S), x > y, yielding x if S happens and y if S does not happen. Assume, without loss of generality, that U(X) = 1 and u(y) = 0. The two individuals have the opportunity of jointly observing a series of identical experiments under which S may or may not hap 9 Related assumptions are affiliation (see Milgrom and Weber 1151) and condirionrrl szochastic dominance (see Riley [ 161) .
lo The monotone likelihood ratio property is often measured in models in auction theory, principai agent problems, etc. 'I Think of the lottery as a slot machine that pays a positive amount if S happens and zero otherwise.
Initially, decision-makers I and II have beliefs F= (Q , CI~, . . . . rxN) and G = (PI, 82, . . . . PN), respectively, over the possible values of the probability of the event S, pl, p2, . . . . pN. The prices P, and P, that decision-makers I and II are willing to pay for this lottery are given by P,= u-'(C aipi), P,= u-'(C /lipi). It follows from Theorem 1 that I is willing to pay more than 11 for this lottery for all possible Bayesian updating (based on common observations of realizations of the event S or 1 S) if and only if F+ G if and only if F is a convex transformation of G.
There is a striking duality between the definition of risk aversion in expected utility theory and Bayes' first-order stochastic dominance. In expected utility theory, one decision-maker is less risk averse than another if and only if his utility function is a convex transformation of the other's utility function. In the above story, where there is uncertainty about the probability, the equivalent condition is that one decision-maker's beliefs over possible values of the probability of success is a convex transformation of the other%.
A screening problem. Consider an employer who cannot observe the ability of potential employees, Output in each period is a random function of the worker's ability, which may take the values a,, a2, . . . . aN, and the effort (or investment, or some other input), 8 2 0, made by the employer in that period. Specifically, let X1, X2, . . . . X, be a set of simple lotteries over the employee's input levels (.x1, x2, . . . . x,}, where 0 < x1 <x2 < .. . < xM. If the worker's ability is ai then his input level in any period is an independent draw from Xi. We assume that the simple lotteries (X,, X2, . . . . X,) are of type 1; that is, they are ordered by the monotone likelihood ratio property. Under this assumption, higher input levels from a worker imply that he is more likely to be of higher ability. If the employer's input is 8 in any period, and the worker's input is xi, the output (in dollars) isf(8, xj), where fs, fX > 0, fee Q 0, and feX > 0. The employer incurs a cost c(0) for providing the input in each period, where c'( .) > 0 and c"( .) 3 0.
Suppose that the employer has to choose between two potential employees, F= where 6 is a discount factor and F( y,, . . . . yk-r) E P for k = 1. In each term of the summation the outer expectation is over y,, ..', y,-1 and the inner expectation is over yk. The expected gross profit from selecting G, ', is similarly defined. Consider the following example. Let f(e, x) = Bx, c(6) = @, T= 2, and 6= I. Further, M=2
and N= 3 with x1 =O, x2= 1, and X, = (1,0), X, = (3, f), X, = (0, 1). Thus the input of a worker with ability level a1 is always zero, etc. Let F= (aI, CQ, ax) = (0.45,0.05,0.5) and G = (jl, pZ, b3) = (0.5,0,0.5). Not only is the expected input level under F greater than that under G (i.e., E[x 1 F] > E[x 1 G]), but also, when F and G are considered as simple lotteries over ability 1eveHs (a,, a*, Q), %; dominates G by ordinary first-order stochastic dominance (i.e., 01~ < PI ar 01~ + c(~ < /I1 + b2). However, direct calculation shows that the employer better off choosing G. Specifically 0.1808 = ZIF < IiTc = 0.1875.
As the next proposition shows, if F> G, then thle expected gross pr is greater under F. Thus, if F is a convex transformation of G then employer should choose F. A sampling problem. An employer wishes to hire one of two workers F and 6, each of whom can produce zero or one unit per period. Each worker's output is an independent draw in every period, but the probability of success for each is unknown. An employer has a distribution over the probabilities of success of each of the two workers. Specifically, Pet O<p, <pz< ... <pN< 1, and let F= (tq, cc*, .'., 01~) and 6=(pr, pZ9..., ,!Iw) be such that C cli = 2 /Ii = 1. The employer believes that there is probability cli [pi] that the probability of success for worker F [G] is pi, i = I, 2, .#., pd. Qf course, some of the ai and pi may be zero.
Although the employer wants to hire only one of the two workers, be may hire both workers during an initial probationary period and make a final decision later. If he hires both, he can observe the total quantity produced in each period, but he cannot tell how many units (zero or one) each worker produced.r3 Every period the employer updates his beliefs about the workers by using Bayes' rule. Even if initially pi dominates by ordinary first-order stochastic dominance (in the sense that cf=, CZ~<C~= I pi, VI) this may change once the employer gets more information about their performance. For example, let pl = 0, p2 = 0.5, p3 = 1, I3 Alternatively, the employer may wish to hire both the workers and place the higher ability worker (the one with a higher expected probability of success) in a more demanding job. In order to gather more information about the workers' abilities he decides to observe their joint output for m periods. and let F= (0,0.5,0.5), G= (0.5,0,0.5). Obviously F dominates G by ordinary first-order stochastic dominance. If in the first period two units of output are observed, the updated G dominates the updated F by ordinary first-order stochastic dominance. Therefore, the employer may wish to hire both workers initially, and make a final decision after m periods. However, as we prove in Proposition 2, if F+ G then after an initial period of observation the updated F dominates the updated G by ordinary first-order stochastic dominance, regardless of the sequence of observed outputs. Thus he can avoid the cost of hiring both initially and select F to begin with. Sequential search. Consider a risk-neutral individual who searches for the lowest price at which to buy a good. He can elicit price quotations from different sellers at the rate of one price quotation per time period. He can search for at most L time periods and, for simplicity, the cost of obtaining each quotation is zero. Once he decides to stop searching, he buys the good at the lowest price quotation obtained so far. Thus, an optimal strategy is to obtain L price samples and select the lowest price. The possible prices are {x1, x2, . . . . x,}, Xl<XZ< -.. <x,. The individual does not know the exact distribution over prices he searches from. Let X1, X,, . . . . X, be the set of possible distributions of prices. Let F and G be two distributions on the set (Xi, X,, . . . . XN}. Suppose that the individual can search for the lowest price either from F or from G. Further, once he chooses one of them he cannot switch to the other at a later stage. (The interpretation is that F and G represent his beliefs on the distributions over prices in two widely separated shopping areas. If he goes to one shopping area, then he does not have the time to go to the other.) Are there conditions on F and G such that, without actually computing the expected minimum prices, one can determine which one of the two distributions on distributions will be preferred by the individual ?
We show that FOSD cannot be used to choose between F and G. Let X, = (1, 0), X, = (4, 4) and X3 = (0, 1) be simple lotteries over two final outcomes x1 and x2, x1 <x2. That is, X, yields x1 with probability 1, etc. Let F= (0, LO), G = (3, 0, f), and F' = (f, 0, 4) be distributions on the set (Xi, X,, X3}. First, consider the case when the individual is allowed to take two price samples from either F or G. Let y, E (x1, x2}, k= 1, 2 denote the kth sample observation. Since Bandit problems. Berry and Fristedt [ 1 ] use ayes' first-order stochastic dominance to compare optimal strategies (under different p problems. Consider the two armed bandit with independent in which one arm, say the second, has a known distribution. ith arm yields an amount qi > 0 with probability xi, i= 1, 2, and yields with probability 1 -rci. The player knows n2 and has a prior distrib~ti~ on or. IIis objective is to maximize the expected discounted reward over an infinite horizon. Berry and Fristedt show that if a prior F on nil first-order stochastically dominates another prior G, then the value bandit (i.e., the supremum of the expected reward over all strategies) under the F-prior is greater than the value under the G-prior.
Rothschild [17] uses the bandit problem to analyze the p good when the seller does not know the demand curve (see also L-131). othschild emphasizes that an individual will eventually settle on one arm and play it forever. However, the chosen arm will not necessarily be the "correct" one. That is, learning may be incomplete and an individual may play the less attractive arm forever. For any given experience on t unknown arm, if a prior F leads to incomplete Iearni then for all priors which are Bayes' first-order stochastically dominate by F, we obtain incomplete learning. Whether similar results go through for correlated arms (see Easley and Kiefer [7] ) is an interesting open question.
Berry and Fristedt also show that for the case of two final outcomes, F+ G is equivalent to condition (ii) of Theorem 1. owever, as pointed out earlier, this is an impractical condition, since it requires that the posterior distributions F( 2") and G(T) be computed for all T. The sufhcient conditions we obtain for F$ G are easily computable.
l4 If the simple lotteries are of type 1 then higher price realizations in the past imply that higher future price realizations are more likely. . Thus it is sufficient to show that after taking one sample the updated distributions satisfy (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6), and the lemma follows by repeated application.
Let Tj be an M-vector with a 1 in the jth place and 0 everywhere else. Thus Tj represents a sample of size one in which xi was observed. We will show that F(Tj) and G(T') satisfy (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6).
Since a,(Tj) > 0 if and only if ai> 0, (2.4) is automatically satisfied by F(Tj). Similarly, (2.5) is satisfied by G(T,). Suppose that b > a. Choose i such that a < i < b. Since F, G satisfy (2.6), we know that clJc~,+ 1 </Ii//Ii+ 1. Also, since ~i(Tj)/ai+l(Tj)=(P,ja,)l(Pi+l,jai+l), and Pi(Tj>/P,+l(Tj)= (f',Bi)I(Pi+ l,jPi+ 1) we have
But (A.3) implies that F( Tj) and G( Tj) satisfy (2.6). 1
In the discussion on type 1 we claimed that (2.7) and (2.8) are equivalent. A proof is provided below. fz is continuous and between each pI and pI+ I it is linear. For all I< M -2,
The last inequality is implied by (2. Since, for arbitrarily small, positive E there exists I such that ai i ai+ ,(T") 2 1 -E, and fii(T') + fii+ ,(T') >, 1 -E, we have E[.x j G(T')] > E[x I F( T')] for large enough I.
The other possibility, when F% G, is that either (2.4) or (2.5) is violated. Assume that gi + pi > 0, Vi, otherwise we can drop Xi. Thus there exists i, i + 1 such that either ai > 0, mi+ I =O, and pi+r>O, or ai>O, Bi=O, and pi+ 1 > 0. Using Lemma A.3 once again, we can find T* such that F( T*) puts most of its mass on Xi, and G (T*) on Xi+ 1, and thus Consider the remaining m, periods. For 0 < j d m qj that in j of the m, periods worker F produced a u not and that in the other m, -j periods worker F worker G did. Let @ be the updated probability at the end of the r~ periods that the probability of success for worker F is pi, and let a: j be the updated probability at the end of the m periods that the probability sf success for worker F is pi, given that in exactly j of ,the m, periods in whit only one unit was produced, worker F was the one to produce it. Similarly, define /I,+ and /3J;,. Of course, a* ='j$& qjliaGj and /3* =cJTo qml-jfiJ,. 
